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Prison Conditions and Recidivism
*
 
We use a unique data set on post-release behavior of former Italian inmates to estimate the 
effect of prison conditions on recidivism. By combining different sources of data we exploit 
variation in prison conditions measured by: 1) the extent of overcrowding at the prison level, 
2) the number of deaths in the facility of detention during an inmate’s stay and 3) the distance 
of the prison from the chief town of the province where the prison is located. By considering 
inmates who served their sentence in a jurisdiction different from the hometown in which they 
live after release, we can include province of residence fixed effects and account for the main 
source of unobserved heterogeneity correlated to prison conditions. We find that a harsher 
prison treatment does not reduce former inmates’ criminal activity. The extent of 
overcrowding and the number of deaths do not decrease the probability to be re-arrested. 
Instead, we find evidence that the degree of isolation measured by distance from the prison 
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“IN GENERALE IL PESO DELLA PENA E LA CONSEGUENZA DI UN DELITTO DEV’ESSERE LA PIÙ 
EFFICACE PER GLI ALTRI E LA MENO DURA CHE SIA POSSIBILE PER CHI LA SOFFRE, PERCHÈ NON SI PUÒ 
CHIAMARE LEGITTIMA SOCIETÀ QUELLA DOVE NON SIA PRINCIPIO INFALLIBILE CHE GLI UOMINI SI SIAN 
VOLUTI ASSOGGETTARE AI MINORI MALI POSSIBILI.” 
1 
Cesare Beccaria, Dei diritti e Delle Pene § XIX  
 
1. Introduction 
In modern criminal justice systems, imprisonment is the most important form of sanction. In the last 
decade prison population has grown substantially in many countries. Figure 1 reports the trends in 
the growth rates of prison population from mid-nineties. Compared to the index year of 1995, the 
number of inmates per 100,000 residents increased by 2004 from 600 to 723 in the U.S., from 99 to 
149 in the U.K. and from 87 to 96 in Italy. Given that an immediate consequence of the growth in 
prison  population  is  a  possible  worsening  of  life  conditions  in  prisons,  a  relevant  issue  is 
understanding how the conditions of incarceration affect the propensity to commit criminal acts. 
Two individuals convicted for one year of imprisonment may serve their sentence in two prisons 
characterized by different conditions and thus face different degrees of punishment. This means that 
the  conditions  of  incarceration  may  have  an  impact  on  the  actual  sanctions  determined  by 
imprisonment and hence on the propensity to engage in future criminal activities. Moreover, the 
large majority of inmates are not condemned to a life sentence, which obviously means that sooner 
or later they will be released. Given this, it is important to understand how prison conditions affect 
a former inmate’s probability of committing another crime. From a policy perspective, changing 
prison conditions could be relatively easier and less costly than other interventions (e.g. increasing 
incapacitation through sentences) that aim to reduce former inmates’ post release criminal activity. 
 
Only a few works use aggregate data to analyze the consequences of incarceration conditions on 
criminal behavior. Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003), using death rates among prisoners as a 
proxy  for  prison  conditions,  show  that  more  punitive  facilities  have  a  small  but  statistically 
significant deterrent effect. Exploiting aggregate data on crime rates, they find a decline in local 
crime rates where prison conditions measured by death rates are harsher. This result conforms to the 
deterrence hypothesis according to which a higher cost of crime deters prospective criminals from 
committing a criminal act (Becker, 1968). Bedard and Helland (2004) exploit the expansion of the 
female penal system capacity in the United States to study the deterrent effects of increasing the 
                                                
1 “The burden of a sanction and the consequences of a crime should be as effective as possible to deter the others and 
the least hard as possible for those suffering the sanctions, as we cannot call as legitimate a society in which it is not a 
shared principle the one stating that citizens want to subject themselves to the lightest possible pain.”   2 
distance of prisons from cities. They find that, on average, increasing this distance (assumed to 
coincide with a reduced number of inmate visits) tends to lower the female crime rate. Overall, 
evidence from previous research resorting to aggregate data suggests that harsher prison conditions 
deter individuals from committing criminal acts. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
The previously cited works share two main weaknesses. First, in testing how prison conditions 
affect crime rates, one cannot exclude the possibility that the measures of prison conditions are 
endogenous to crime rates. Second, these works do not clarify whether the singled out deterrent 
effect of punitiveness is induced by deterring potential criminals, by deterring former inmates, or 
both.
2  In  this  paper  we  focus  on  how  prison conditions,  measured  by  several  indicators  affect 
recidivism of former inmates. The results we obtain are not consistent with the evidence that worse 
prison conditions deter former inmates. Rather, we find that the degree of isolation, measured by 
distance of the prison from the chief town of the province where the prison is located, has a positive 
effect on recidivism. We argue that our results indicate that the deterrent effects of bad prison 
quality on crime found by previous papers are probably due to deterring potential criminals and not 
criminals already treated by imprisonment.  
 
To estimate the effect of prison conditions on recidivism, we use a large, unique data set, reporting 
individual  level  data  on  recidivism  of  former  inmates  that  were  released  upon  the  Collective 
Clemency Bill approved by the Italian Parliament in July 2006. This law, enacted to address the 
widespread  situation  of  overcrowding  in  Italian  prisons,  provided  for  an  immediate  three-year 
reduction in detention for all inmates who had committed a crime before May, 2006. Upon approval 
of the bill, almost 22000 inmates were released from 198 Italian prisons on August, 1st 2006. A 
first important feature of our data set is that all these prisoners are released at the same moment and 
thus face equal crime opportunities. This is relevant for our empirical analysis because it eliminates 
the confounding element of time-varying unobservable characteristics that might be correlated to 
prison conditions. Nevertheless, in testing the effects of prison conditions on recidivism, we cannot 
rule out the existence of time invariant unobservable variables which could bias our estimates via 
correlation to prison conditions and to probability of recidivism. For example, prison quality might 
be worse in areas where former inmates have a lower opportunity cost of committing a crime. More 
                                                
2 By potential or prospective criminals we mean individuals who have never been imprisoned.    3 
generally,  prison  quality  might  be  correlated  to  omitted  characteristics  of  the  province  where 
inmates live after release, leading to biased estimates of prison treatment on recidivism. 
 
To  address  the  endogeneity  problems  involved  in  estimating  the  effect  of  prison  quality  on 
recidivism, we exploit a unique feature of our data set. Many inmates spent their sentence in a 
jurisdiction different from their hometown for reasons ranging from overcrowding in the prison 
closest  to  their  hometown  to  the  Italian  Prison  Administration  view  of  that  facility  as  being 
incompatible with the inmate. We label these prisoners as “movers”. As we shall discuss in more 
detail in the paper, the institutional features of assigning movers to prisons entail that assignment 
does not depend on individual characteristics that may explain recidivism and at the same time may 
be correlated to measures of prison conditions. As a consequence of restricting our sample only to 
movers, we can control for province of residence fixed effects and so account for any unobserved 
heterogeneity at the province level where these former inmates live. Considering that this is the 
main source of unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated to prison conditions, we are thus 
able to minimize an important bias of our estimates. 
 
Our analysis concerns two dimensions of prison conditions. First, prison harshness. We focus on 
two different features of prison severity: the extent of overcrowding and the number of deaths (by 
all  causes)  in  prison  during  the  inmate’s  stay.  Death  rates  and  overcrowding  are  likely  to  be 
correlated with many aspects of unpleasantness of prison facilities, including space limitations, 
competition for resources, bad health and bad health-care conditions among others. Second, the 
degree of prisoners’ isolation from the rest of society. As a proxy for the degree of isolation we use 
the distance from the prison of detention to the chief-town of the province
3 where the prison is 
located.  Longer  distances  imply  higher  costs  (in  terms  of  transportation,  organization  and 
motivation)  for  associations,  groups,  organizations  of  volunteers  to  develop  social  activities, 
education, and job training for inmates. This means that the longer is the distance of a prison from 
the province chief town, the weaker are the social ties in which prisoners are embedded (and thus a 
higher degree of isolation from the rest of society).  
 
We do  not find evidence supporting  the  idea that harsher  prison conditions reduce  recidivism. 
Although the variation in our measures of prison conditions is large, all specifications reveal an 
                                                
3 Italy is administratively organized in territorial areas. In particular, there are 20 regions and each region is composed 
of several provinces (the total number of provinces is 109). A province corresponds to a large area around a chief town 
in  which  are  concentrated  the  main  economic,  social  and  administrative  activities  of  the  area  (e.g.  courts,  health 
services, local head quarters of political parties, volunteer associations).    4 
extremely small and statistically non significant effect of prison conditions on recidivism. This 
empirical evidence suggests that previous results on the effects of prison conditions on crime rates 
are  probably  due  to  general  deterrent  effects  on  prospective  criminals.  Indeed,  worse  prison 
conditions do not seem to deter individuals who have already been incarcerated.
4  
 
Instead, we find that prison location has an effect on recidivism. In particular, an increased distance 
of the detention facility from the chief town of the province increases the propensity to commit new 
crimes. We calculate that an increase of the distance of the prison of 10 km is associated to a 2.8 
percent drop in the probability of recidivism. This means that prison isolation from the rest of the 
society tends to increase recidivism. Our results on distance indicate how the prison society osmosis 
affects  crime.  By  isolating  individuals  from  external  social  networks,  prison  has  two  opposite 
effects. On one side, by isolating from possible contacts with criminal networks, it is likely that 
prison isolation tends to reduce future criminal opportunities; on the other side, more isolation 
means also less opportunity to maintain positive social relations or human capital, thus increasing 
the post release returns from crime. Our results suggest that this second force tends to dominate and 
so  condemns  prison  isolation  to  increasing  recidivism.  As  long  as  imprisonment  is  essentially 
isolation from the rest of society, these results pose a provoking question about the effectiveness of 
imprisonment as a sanction at least for what concerns the deterrent effects of isolation for those 
already sanctioned. This result is particularly salient in light of findings of Chen and Shapiro (2007) 
who  show  that  spending  a  sentence  in  higher  security  levels  in  U.S.  prisons  (which  arguably 
correspond to higher degree of isolation) implies a significantly higher post release propensity to 
commit  a  crime.  Chen  and  Shapiro  (2007)  use  individual-level  data  to  analyze  how  a  higher 
security level in U.S. prisons affects recidivism. They provide credible estimates of the effect of 
harsh  prison  conditions  on  recidivism  rates  by  exploiting  a  discontinuity  in  the  assignment  of 
federal prisoners to security levels. Hence, they estimate the effect of a single proxy for prison 
conditions  (higher  security  level)  for  a  particular  subset  of  inmates  (i.e.  the  most  dangerous 
inmates). Our data allow us to employ a different identification strategy through which we can 
capture the effect of several indicators of prison conditions for a generality of inmates. This paper 
                                                
4  This  might  be  surprising.  If  we  assume  that  incarceration  leads  criminals  to  update  their  beliefs  about  the 
consequences of punishment, an implication of the basic crime model of Becker (1968) is that having experienced a 
more severe punishment should lead to a lower propensity to recommit a crime. Hence, to rationalize our results we 
should note that other forces can offset the deterrent effect of harsher prison conditions. In particular, harsher prison 
sentences may imply a higher human capital deployment and worse labour outcomes (Waldfogel, 1994). Moreover, 
harsher prison conditions may induce hostility toward society that leads to an increased likelihood of deviant behavior 
upon release (Murton, 1976). 
   5 
also attempts to separate some channels through which prison conditions may affect recidivism. We 
conclude that, whereas harshness of prison conditions per se should not imply higher recidivism, 
the degree of isolation induces a sizable positive effect on the propensity to commit another crime. 
More in general our paper is related to the extensive literature on crime and punishment started 
from Becker (1968)
5 and in particular to a recent literature studying the effects of prison treatment 




The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe our data set and in section 3 we report the 
identification strategy. Section 4 presents the results. Finally, in section 5 we draw some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Data Sources and Description 
We perform our analysis of the effects of prison conditions on recidivism by means of a unique data 
set built by resorting to various sources. First, individual level variables about former inmates’ 
individual  characteristics  and  recidivism  are  drawn  from  an  internal  database  that  the  Italian 
Department  of  Prison  Administration  (DAP)  maintains  on  offenders  under  its  care.  We  were 
granted access to the DAP database records on all the individuals released pursuant to the collective 
pardon law between 1 August and 28 February 2007. This law, enacted to address the widespread 
situation of overcrowding in Italian prisons, provided for an immediate three-year reduction in 
detention for all inmates who had committed a crime before 2 May 2006. This feature of the data is 
particularly useful for our analysis because all the subjects in our sample are analyzed in the same 
time span, thus avoiding any possible correlation between time and prison quality. The full sample 
includes 25716 individuals. For each individual the data provide information on whether or not the 
individual commit another crime within the period between release from prison and February, 28th 
                                                
5 For surveys of empirical and theoretical works: Bushway and Reuters (forthcoming) Levitt and Miles (2007) and 
Polinsky and Shavell (2000), Western, Kling and Weiman (2001), Garoupa (1997). Some recent contributions are: Di 
Tella and Dubra (forthcoming), Owens (2006), Evans and Owens (2007), Helland and Tabarrok (2007), Levitt (2004). 
For models that embed Becker's paradigm in a dynamic equilibrium framework see Imrohologlu, Merlo and Rupert 
(2004) and Gallipoli and Fella (2006). 
6  Pintoff  (2006)  capitalizes  on  discontinuities  in  punishment  that  arise  in  Washington  State's  juvenile  sentencing 
guidelines to identify the effect of incarceration (but not of prison quality) on the post release criminal behaviour of 
juveniles. Kling (2006) uses a variety of research designs to estimate the effect of increases in incarceration length on 
the employment and earnings prospects of individuals, finding no significant effects. Kuziemko (2007) compares the 
parole system with a fixed-sentences regime by exploiting policy shocks and institutional features in Georgia and 
provides evidences that abolition of the parole system has increased both per-prisoner costs and recidivism. Finally, 
Drago et al. (2007) show that time spent in prison tends to lower a former inmate’ response to post release expected   6 
2007. The data set contains information concerning a large set of variables at the individual and 
facility level. For each individual, information is reported on: the facility where the sentence was 
served, the official length of the sentence, the actual time served in the facility, the kind of crime 
committed  (i.e.,  the  last  crime  committed  in  the  individual's  criminal  history).  The  Appendix 
provides a description of the crimes included in the different categories. Moreover, data report 
inmates’ age, level of education, marital status, nationality, province of residence, employment 
status before being sentenced to prison, and whether the individual had a final sentence (or was 
waiting for the first verdict or for the results of an appeal) at the date of release. Since data on 
subsequent convictions are not available, we use a subsequent criminal charge and imprisonment as 
the measure for recidivism.  
 
For data on prison quality, the rate of overcrowding at the facility level is directly provided by the 
DAP database facility. Excluding judiciary mental hospitals from our sample (98 inmates), we have 
198 prisons, the total number of Italian prisons. Data on the number of facility deaths that occurred 
during each former inmate’s period of imprisonment were constructed by resorting to the report on 
“Deaths in Prison” by the Associazione Ristretti
7. For each inmate we count the number of deaths 
that occurred in the facility of detention from 2003 (or, alternatively, from an inmate’s moment of 
entrance into the facility for those arrested after 1 January 2003) to July 2007 (the months of exit 
for all individuals in our sample). Note that this measure of deaths occurring in a prison is different 
form the measure used by Katz et al. (2003) who resort to aggregate data and use the total number 
of  deaths  (per  1000  inmates)  occurred  in  a  state’s  prisons.  Unlike  Katz  et  al.  (2003),  we  can 
construct a measure of the number of deaths that occurred in a facility from the moment of entrance 
of each single individual in the data set (in particular, for those who entered starting from January 
2003).
8 This measure is particularly useful evaluating the effect of prison conditions on post release 
criminal behavior as it captures the specific conditions faced by each individual during the time 
served in a facility.  
Finally, we construct independently the measure of distance. We report the road distance between 
each facility and chief town of the province where the facility is located by calculating the distance 
                                                
7 Associazione Ristretti is an association for inmates’ rights. The report on deaths in prison has been conducted annually 
by collecting directly news about deaths in the Italian prison system. It reports monthly information about each person 
dead at facility level (the report is downloadable from the website: www.ristretti.it).  
8 It is worth noting that the measure of deaths we use in estimating our models is in per capita values (i.e. number of 
deaths  over the total  number of inmates in  the facility, as  of July  2007).  We resort to the per capita  measure to 
normalize the number of deaths for each prison population.   7 
between the facility address and each town
9. The result of the process is a unique data set including, 
for each of the almost 26,000 former inmates, a measure of recidivism, individual characteristics, 
and facility level information.  
 
Table  I  reports  descriptive  statistics  on  the  individual-level  data  both  for  the  entire  sample  of 
released individuals and the for the sub sample of those who served a sentence in a facility outside 
their  province  of  residence  (the  so-called  movers).  As  will  come  clear  in  the  next  section  we 
analyze the movers in order to address the main identification challenge of this paper, the likely 
endogeneity  between  criminal  opportunities  and  prison  conditions  in  a  certain  province.  By 
restricting our analysis to the movers we are able to control for province of residence fixed effects, 
thus absorbing any kind of unobserved heterogeneity in the inmates’ area of living. Even though 
possible differences between movers and non movers are not an issue for our identification strategy, 
it is worth noting that the observable characteristics are on average similar across the whole sample 
and the sub sample of movers. In particular, for both groups the recidivists constituted 11% of the 
final sample. Males make up 95% of the sample. The average age of former inmates is nearly 37; 
34% of them were employed before being sentenced to prison, and married people were 29% of 
both samples. For measures of prison harshness, we observe that the average overcrowding rate 
(number of inmates in the facility of detention for each 100 places available) faced by former 
inmates in our sample was about 150. Each former inmate had seen 1.26 (1.01 if mover) people 
dying in his/her facility during the period of detention. The average facility/jurisdiction chief-town 
distance  is  15.5  Km  (18.74  Km  for  the  movers).  The  final  sample  we  use  is  made  by  13160 
individuals distributed between almost 200 different residential facilities.  
 
(Table I about here) 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Identifying the Effects of Life Quality and Isolation in Prison 
 
The available measures of life quality in prison are the overcrowding index and deaths per capita in 
prison. For the first measure, the model we estimate can be written as 
 
                                                
9 We use the road distance as calculated us by the internet map site www.viamichelin.com. This allows us to calculate 
the distance to any facility address from the chief town city center coordinates (the web-site automatically calculates the 
coordinates of the city center).   8 
,
) ( 1 ij k i k j ij x ngindex overcrowdi y e b b + + = ∑                                (1) 
 
where i denotes the individual and j the prison where the individual’s sentence was served. The 
outcome we observed, y, is equal to 1 if the individual was rearrested during the interval of time 
considered (seven months) and 0 otherwise. The set of variables at the individual level, denoted by 
x, includes gender, marital status, education, state of judgment, the most recent crime, employment 
status before arrest and sentence. The types of crime and the sentence  are  the  most important 
variables accounting for the dangerouness of the former inmate. We include also the time served as 
individual variable because it is, in general, different from the sentence  (time served and sentence 
do not coincide since our data come from the Collective Clemency Bill that provided an immediate 
three-year reduction in detention for all inmates who had committed a crime before 2 May, 2006).  
 
The  empirical  challenge  when  estimating  the  effects  of  life  quality  in  prison  on  recidivism  is 
addressing potential problems of endogeneity in quality measures. It could be that prison quality is 
worse in areas where former inmates have a lower opportunity cost of committing a crime. For 
example, a higher overcrowding index may simply be the result of many arrests in a city in which 
the relative cost of committing crime is low. It could be equally possible that areas with lower crime 
intensity have prisons with bad quality measures. In any case, the estimated coefficient  1 b  would be 
biased.  In  order  to  provide  credible  estimate  of  the  relationship  between  prison  quality  and 
recidivism, we must account for this unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
The idea behind our solution to address the endogeneity of the prison quality measure is to exploit a 
feature of the Italian prison system. As mentioned previously, many prisoners serve their sentence 
in other than hometown jurisdictions. We call these inmates by “movers”. Denote h the province 
where a mover lives after release. The equation that we can estimate only on movers is: 
 
,
) ( 1 ijh h k i k j ijh x ngindex overcrowdi y e l b b + + + = ∑               (2) 
 
where  h l   are  province  fixed  effects  that  accounts  for  differences  across  provinces  that  drive 
criminal behavior after release. Notice that without information on the movers, we could not have 
included fixed effects at the province level. Instead, in model (2), we have that for individual i, 
prison j is always located in a province other than the one where individual i lives after release. In   9 
this  way  we  absorb  any  kind  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  of  this  province  that  would  lead 
coefficient  1 b  to be biased. Under the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity across movers is 
uncorrelated with prison quality, the estimated  1 b  captures the causal impact of our measure of 
prison quality on recidivism. In section 3.2 we discuss in detail this identifying assumption. 
 
When we focus on the recidivism effects of the other proxy for prison quality (deaths), we still 
exploit the presence of the “movers” but need not assume that unobserved heterogeneity across 
movers is uncorrelated with prison quality. The reason for this is straightforward: since the number 
of deaths per capita
10 varies at the individual level within each prison, we can also include prison 
fixed effects in the regressions as: 
 
ijh j h k i k ij ijh x deaths y e a l b b + + + + = ∑ ) ( 1 .                                     (3) 
 
Prison fixed effects control for any possible non random assignment of movers to harsher prisons. 
Some clarifications regarding model (3) are necessary. The number of deaths that occur during the 
period of imprisonment is clearly positively correlated with the inmate’s prison spell. However, by 
including time served and sentence as additional regressors in (3), for a given sentence the deaths 
variable will not merely be picking up the effects of more time served in the prison. Once we 
control for sentence, whether one inmate served more time than another is due to the date of entry 
in prison, a variable that is as good as random. Hence, controlling for sentence and time served, 
inmates within each prison differ in the number of deaths seen for reasons that are unlikely to be 
correlated to unobservables. 
 
The last issue analyzed in this paper is how isolation affects recidivism. The aim of imprisonment is 
to isolate condemned individuals from the rest of society for a certain period of time with the 
purpose both of incapacitating and then of re-educating these individuals to social life. Since prison 
essentially  means  isolation  from  society,  testing  how  the  degree  of  prison  isolation  affects 
recidivism is a particularly important issue. As a proxy for the degree of prison isolation we use the 
distance of prison from the closest province chief town. We believe that this variable captures the 
degree of isolation of prisoners for this reason: ceteris paribus, the more distant is a prison facility 
from the chief town, the higher are the costs for associations, groups of volunteers, and civil right 
                                                
10 As mentioned above in the regressions we use the number of deaths per capita. Results are robust to measures of 
deaths seen by each inmate in absolute value.   10 
organizations  to  access  to  prisons  developing  social  activities,  education,  and  job  training  for 
inmates.
11 The basic idea behind this assumption is that, since both the population density and the 
density of associations are higher in chief towns, offering a certain social activity in a prison more 
distant  from  the  town  implies  higher  costs  of  transportation,  organization  and  motivation  of 
volunteers. For the interpretation of the results it is important to know whether more distant prisons 
are associated to more amenities (e.g. more distant prisons might have been built more recently). In 
this  case  distance  would  capture  good  prison  conditions  rather  than  isolation.  Although  casual 
evidence suggests that this does not seem the case, we do not have data to address this concern. 
However,  we  observe  that  the  raw  correlation  between  our  measure  of  distance  and  deaths  is 
positive (0.1016), suggesting that more distant prisons are associated to worse life conditions.  
 
Estimating the effects of prison location on recidivism may present problems of endogeneity similar 
to those already discussed for the overcrowding index. It is possible that, in areas with higher 
opportunities to commit another crime, prisons have been built more distant from the province chief 
town in order to minimize the social ties of inmates. Or it may be that, in areas with high crime 
intensity,  prisons  have  been  built  closer  to  the  chief  town  in  order  to  minimize  the  costs  of 
imprisonment. In order to address these potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity, as before 
we restrict our sample to the “movers”, those inmates who served their sentence in a jurisdiction 
other than their hometown. Hence we estimate model (2) by including prison distance from the 
chief town as a key control variable.   
 
3.2. Evidence on the Identifying Assumption 
The  key  assumption  for  the  identification  of  model  (2)  is  that,  conditioning  on  the  region  of 
residence,  the assignment of movers does not depend on individual characteristics that explain 
recidivism and are correlated to prison quality (we don’t need this assumption when estimating 
model  (3)  because  the  inclusion  of  prison  fixed  effects  controls  for  any  possible  non  random 
assignment of movers). There are arguments and evidence supporting the identifying assumption. 
The Italian law
12 on this issue indicates that whenever possible, assignment to facilities should 
follow a territorial criterion, namely, inmates should be assigned to facilities close to their town of 
residence  and,  in  general,  within  the  province  of  residence.  If  arrested  and  waiting  for  first 
judgment, prisoners can be assigned to a facility close to where they were arrested. After final 
                                                
11  In  Italy  there  is  a  strong  tradition  of  associations  organizing  activities  in  prison  facilities,  with  an  important 
contribution given by volunteers.  
12 See in particular the Decree of the President of the Republic, 230, 30 June 2000, and the Law 354/1975 (Article 42).   11 
judgment,  the  territorial  criterion  applies.  Nonetheless,  the  provisions  of  the  law  are  often  not 
applied. Indeed, an inmate can be assigned to a facility outside her province of residence if the 
Department  of  Prison  Administration  (DAP)  envisages  some  kind  of  incompatibility.  Possible 
reasons are: a reasonable presumption that assignment to a facility inside the province of residence 
could be dangerous for the inmate and/or for other inmates in the facility; particular needs of the 
detention facility (e.g. overcrowding or inaccessibility); or needs of the inmate such as health care 
or study. When an inmate is assigned to a facility outside her province of residence but still in the 
same region, it is the regional directorate of DAP that decides in which facility she will be assigned. 
If for any reason the mover is assigned to a facility outside her region of residence, the destination 
is decided directly by the central directorate of the DAP.
13  We conducted several interviews with 
members of the inmates’ rights association “Ristretti” and DAP officers
14 to understand more in 
detail the decision process concerning movers. As a first step, we need to know the variables that 
the  decision-maker (the DAP officer) uses to decide  who  becomes a mover  and then how the 
assignment to facilities works.  
 
According to the information collected in our interviews, the decision-maker decides that an inmate 
cannot be assigned to the facility closest to her home-town in two possible cases. At the moment of 
the  arrest  or  conviction  each  inmate  is  provided  with  an  inmate’s  dossier  containing  personal 
information and a summary of the judiciary decision about her sentence. On the basis of this dossier 
the decision-maker evaluates if there is any reason of incompatibility of the inmate with the facility 
closest to her home-town. It is worth noting that for inmates at their first experience with the prison 
system the dossier roughly contains the same characteristics we have in our data set (i.e. personal 
characteristics, sentence length and sentence motivation, in our case the crime committed). The 
second reason of incompatibility is that the closest facility has reached a maximum threshold of 
overcrowding. For each facility such a threshold depends on the prison administration evaluation 
and may vary according to local conditions at the facility level (e.g., in some facilities, in periods of 
prison tension and violence an overcrowding rate of 150 percent may be evaluated above such a 
threshold  level,  whereas  in  other  periods  this  overcrowding  rate  may  be  considered  below  the 
threshold). Once an inmate is designated as a mover, the decision process governing assignment to 
                                                
13 Italian public administration is in general organized on territorial basis. Central administrations are on the top at 
national level and then there are territorial administration at the levels of regions and provinces (within regions) 
14 We wish to thank Francesco Morelli (Ristretti) and Antonella Barone (Ministry of Justice) for providing us with 
precious information about the assignment process.   12 
facilities follows a “space availability” criterion.
15 An inmate is assigned to one of the facilities that 
at the moment of assignment are less overcrowded or below the threshold level. Hence, for movers 
the facility is determined on the level of available space at the moment of arrest or conviction of 
other facilities. If the moment of conviction is orthogonal to inmates’ unobserved characteristics, 




We examine whether the data support the hypotheses that the assignment of movers to a facility of 
higher or lower quality does not depend on unobservables influencing the likelihood of recidivism. 
Specifically, we test whether (conditioning on the region of residence, the administrative level at 
which assignment decisions are taken) there is a significant relationship between the observable 
characteristics of movers and the index of overcrowding of the facility of destination and prison 
distance from the chief town. This can be done by estimating regressions of these two measures on 
observable  characteristics  of  movers  and  then  by  running  an  F-test  on  the  coefficients  of  the 
inmates’ observables. For example, if there is selection on unobservables, we should also expect 
variables describing the degree of dangerousness (type of crime and sentence) to predict prison 
harshness. On the contrary, a non significant F-test at conventional levels suggests no significant 
relationship between (all) individual characteristics and the quality of the facility of assignment. 
This does not prove random  assignment,  since  the assumption requires  there be no correlation 
between prison quality and both observable and unobservable movers’ characteristics. However, if 
selection on observables is similar to selection on unobservables, then the lack of a significant 
relationship between prison quality and observable characteristics indicates empirical support for 
the identification strategy. In symbols, we test the following models: 
 
ij n k i k ij x ngindex overcrowdi e g b + + =∑ ) ( , 
ij n k i k ij x prisondist e g b + + =∑ ) ( . 
 
Here j and i stand for the facility level and individual level indexes and the  n g  are region of 
residence fixed effects that account for differences across regional DAP directorates that drive the 
                                                
15 For example in a recent interview the director of the regional director of DAP for the Bologna region declared that 
the facilities in the region are reaching a level of overcrowding that will require to transfer inmates to regions where 
more space is available (See the daily newspaper: Il Resto del Carlino March 4
th 2008, “Bologna: Provveditore; carceri 
piene? Trasferiamo i detenuti”)  
16 There are other papers supporting the idea that inmates’ unobservable characteristics are orthogonal to the moment of 
conviction see Drago Galbiati and Vertova (2007) and Kuziemko (2007).   13 
assignment  to  facilities.
17  The  test  of  the  joint  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  k b on 
observables at the individual level are all equal to 0 gives an F-statistic of 1.22 (p=0.22) when we 
regress the overcrowding index, and of 1.34 (p=0.13) when we regress prison distance. Hence, at 
conventional level, we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that all the coefficients on individual 
observables are equal to 0.  
 
As we can see from Table 1, movers are different from non movers in some individual variables. 
By regressing a dummy equal to one if an inmate is a mover on all the observables, we have that 
some individual variables are strong predictors for being a mover (in particular the length of the 
sentence and being non Italian have a positive effect on the probability to be a mover, whereas age 
has a negative effect; the R-squared in this regression is 0.16). It seems plausible to assume that if 
assignment of movers to prisons is not as good as random, in the assignment process the decision-
maker should use at least some of the information he actually uses for determining who becomes a 
mover. For example, one should expect that if assignment is not random, sentence length should 
matter for the assignment. The fact that length of the sentence and some other variables predict the 
mover status but not the prison quality measures lends further support to our hypothesis of no 
correlation between individual determinants of recidivism and the probability of being assigned to a 
better or worse quality prison for movers.  
 
4. Results 
Given the large number of  fixed  effects included  in our  models, we rely on  linear probability 
models. Our dependent variable is 1 if between 1 August 2006 and 28 February 2007, the individual 
was rearrested and zero otherwise. All specifications include individual variables: age, sentence, 
juridical  status,  education,  employment  status  and  marital  status  before  the  first  conviction, 
nationality, gender and time served. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the prison level to 
allow any arbitrary autocorrelation of the errors in each prison.  
 
We start by discussing results on the effects of overcrowding index on recidivism. Taking the 
overcrowding index as the indicator of quality of life in prison, in Table II we present empirical 
estimates of variations on equation (2) for movers only. In column 1 we include as additional 
covariates  only  individual  variables.  The  coefficient  on  overcrowding  index  is  negative  and 
                                                
17 We include region fixed effects instead of providence fixed effects (which are included in model (2)) because the 
institutional decision process is governed at the regional level (as mentioned in the introduction, Italy is divided in 
twenty regions and each region is composed of several provinces).    14 
associated with large standard errors (t-statistics equal to -0.85). It reveals a very small effect on 
recidivism. Even taking the lower bound extreme of the 95% confidence interval, we have that an 
increase of 1 percentage point in the overcrowding index implies a reduction of 0.0002 in the 
probability of being re-arrested. In the next two columns we include the type of crime and the 
province of residence fixed effects. The coefficient is still negative and statistically not significant 
at conventional levels. It decreases in absolute value after inclusion of type of crime and fixed 
effects. Overall, we obtain a small and not statistically significant effect of overcrowding. We try to 
obtain more precise estimated effects of the overcrowding index on recidivism by excluding from 
the regressions: potential outliers, the most populated prisons, and then least populated prisons in 
absolute  values.  However,  neither  the  size  nor  the  precision  of  the  estimated  effects  improves 
(results not reported).  
   
(Table II about here) 
 
We now present the results using prison deaths per capita as indicator of the quality of life in prison 
(see  Table  III).  In  column  1  the  results  are  including  only  individual  variables  as  additional 
covariates. We now have a positive coefficient on deaths per capita but it is not precisely estimated 
(t-statistic, adjusted for clustering, equal to 0.87). In the next column we include also the type of 
crime. From column 1 and 2 we do not find evidence that harsher prison conditions lead to a higher 
probability of recidivism. Column 3 reports results from specification that includes province of 
residence fixed effects; the results obtained are similar. This suggests that finding no evidence of a 
negative impact of deaths per capita rates on recidivism is not due to the omission of heterogeneity 
at the province level.   
 
(Table III about here) 
 
To explore whether prison unobserved heterogeneity might be a reason for the positive coefficient, 
in column 4 we present results from the specification that “soaks up” most variation in the data by 
including province of residence fixed effects and prison fixed effects. By including prison fixed 
effects we absorb any kind of unobserved heterogeneity at the prison level and control for any 
potential non random assignment of prisoners into prisons. We can include prison fixed effects 
because the key variable differs for each mover even at the prison level (it depends on how many 
deaths occurred during the prison spell of the former inmates (see the discussion of model (3) in 
section 3.2). The coefficient on deaths per capita is still positive but it is not precisely estimated (the   15 
t-statistic is 0.61). Overall, from this analysis we do not find compelling evidence that harsh prison 
conditions reduce recidivism. 
 
Finally, we discuss our results on the effects of prison location on recidivism. Column 1 of Table 
IV presents results including only individual variables as additional covariates. We find a positive 
and highly statistically significant coefficient on distance from the province chief town. In column 2 
we report the results of the regression including also the type of crime committed and in column 3 
we include also province of residence fixed effects. Results are similar: the coefficient on distance 
is still positive and highly statistically significant. It is interesting to note that the coefficient is 
essentially unchanged by the inclusion of more controls. Our data suggest that prison location has 
an effect on recidivism. In particular, the distance of the facility of detention from the province 
chief town increases the probability of committing another crime. The estimated effect is not small: 
given that in our sample the probability of returning to crime is 0.11, the results suggest that an 
increase of the distance of the prison of 10 km leads to a 2.8 percent drop in the probability of 
recidivism. We experimented with different robustness checks by including in the regression 4, 5, 
and 6 dummy for distance (e.g., first dummy equal to one if distance is lower than 5 km, second 
dummy equal to 1 if distance is between 5 and 20 km and so on). The results are robust and indicate 
a statistically significant effect. From the last column of Table IV we observe that the effect of 
distance is not explained by the number of deaths and overcrowding (i.e. the coefficient on distance 
is essentially unchanged by the inclusion of these variables). This supports the idea that the effect of 
distance on recidivism is not due to prison harshness per se, but rather to isolation. Longer distance 
implies less accessibility for volunteers and for religious and civil rights associations that wish to 
visit the facilities. If a higher degree of accessibility (i.e., a higher degree of osmosis between prison 
and  the  rest  of  society)  increases  the  opportunities  to  maintain  or  increase  human  capital  for 
inmates, then a higher isolation and higher cost of reaching the facilities implied by greater distance 
may  negatively  affect  the  post  release  legal  opportunities  of  inmates,  thus  increasing  their 
propensity to commit another crime.  
 
(Table IV about here) 
 
Overall, controlling  for  an  important  source  of  unobserved  heterogeneity,  we  find  that  harsher 
prison conditions measured by the extent of overcrowding and the number of deaths do not reduce 
recidivism,  whereas  prison  isolation  is  associated  to  higher  post-release  criminal  behavior.  To   16 
gauge the impact of controlling for heterogeneity at the province level, we observe that from the 
previous tables, the estimated standard errors of the key variable (and other individual variables) are 
generally smaller when we include province of residence fixed effects. Although the inclusion of 
about 100 dummy in the regression should lead to an increase of the standard errors, we observe the 
opposite finding. This suggests that the there are several effects on recidivism that vary at the 
province level and that this is potentially an important source of heterogeneity to condition on. This 
is particularly true for the specification in which we estimate the effect of the distance from the 
prison of detention to the chief-town of the province where the prison is located. Indeed, by running 
a regression for the whole sample (movers and non-movers) without fixed effects we obtain a 
smaller coefficient on distance that is only marginally statistically different from zero (results not 
reported). 
 
Finally, a potential issue is whether all the results for movers can be generalized to all individuals in 
our sample. Although differences in observables between movers and non-movers are not large, 
movers are not a random sample. The main aspect in which movers differ from the rest of the 
sample is the average sentence, with movers having, on average, a longer sentence (see Table 1). 
Since sentence reflects the degree of dangerousness of inmates, it could be possible that our results 
are driven by a subset of movers with very long sentences, whose post-release behavior is not 
affected by a harsher treatment in prison. To explore this possibility, in the previous specifications 
we  include  an  interaction  term  between  sentence  and  the  key  variable  that  proxy  for  prison 
conditions. If the interaction term is not statistically different from zero, we can conclude that 
heterogeneity in sentence across movers is not driving the results presented above. As Table 5 
shows, the coefficient on the interaction term is always associated to large standard errors. We do 
not find convincing evidence that movers with longer sentences respond differently to previous 
harsher prison treatment. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have investigated the effects of prison conditions on post release recidivism among 
former Italian inmates. We have studied the effects of two main dimensions of prison conditions: 
prison harsheness (proxied by prison overcrowding and death rates in prison) and prison isolation 
(proxied by the distance between prison and province chief-town). Our results suggest that harsher 
prison conditions do not exert any significant effect on former inmates post release propensity to 
commit new crimes. However, higher prison distance from chief towns and hence higher degrees of 
isolation positively affect post release crime. Given that former studies like Katz et. al (2003) and   17 
Bedard and Helland (2004) show that harsher prison conditions are associated to lower crime rates, 
it is worth asking what kind of implications we should draw from our results. Because our study is 
the first of its type to exploit individual-level data from outside the U.S., it is difficult to make 
quantitative comparisons between our results and other studies relying on U.S. data. Nonetheless, 
we can observe that our findings help to clarify some former results in the literature. Chen and 
Shapiro  (2007)  show  that  the  general  deterrent  effect  found  by  Katz  et.  al  (2003)  could  be 
outweighed by the positive impact on recidivism implied by higher security levels in the U.S.. Our 
results suggest that the effect found by Chen and Shapiro could arguably be induced by the higher 
degree  of  isolation  being  related  to  the  higher  security  levels,  whereas  harshness  of  prison 
conditions per se should not imply higher recidivism. Nonetheless we cannot conclude that policy 
makers should ignore the effects of harsher prison conditions, or, even worse, that harsher prison 
conditions are desirable because they seem to have a general deterrent effect. As shown by Katz et 
al. (2003), the aggregate impact of changing prison conditions on crime rates appears to be small: 
“Given the limited efficiency gains implied by these estimates, the moral and ethical considerations 
surrounding  these  issues  would  appear  to  dominate  any  economic  arguments.  In  a  society 
predicated on civil liberties, the social costs of degrading living conditions in prisons beyond their 
current state are likely to overwhelm any marginal reductions in crime” (Katz et al., p. 340). Our 
results  confirm  this  view  and  suggest  that  we  should  more  carefully  consider  the  limits  of 















   18 
References 
Beccaria, C. (1764). Dei Delitti e Delle Pene. Livorno. 
 
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy. 
76 (2): 169-217. 
 
Bedard,  K.  Helland,  E.  (2004)  The  location  of  women’s  prisons  and  the  deterrence  effect  of 
“harder” time. International Review of Law and Economics. 24, 147-167. 
 
Bushway, S. and Reuter, P. (forthcoming). Economists’ Contribution to the Study of Crime and the 
Criminal Justice System. Crime and Justice: A Review of Research. 
 
Chen, K.M., Shapiro, J.M. (2007). Does Prison Harden Inmates? American Law and Economics 
Review. 
 
Di Tella, R. Dubra. Juan (Forthcoming). Crime and Punishment in the 'American Dream'. Journal 
of Public Economics. 
 
Drago, F., Galbiati, R. and Vertova P. (2007) The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment. CEPR Discussion Paper 6401. 
 
Evans, W.N. Owens, E.G. (2007). COPS and Crime. Journal of Public Economics, 91(2) pp.181-
201. 
 
Fella, G. and Gallipoli, G. (2006). Education and Crime over the Life Cycle, mimeo, University 
College of London. 
 
Garoupa, N. (1997).  The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, Journal of Economic Surveys, 
11(3), pages 267-95. 
 
Helland,  E.  and  Tabarrok,  A.  (2007).  Does  Three  Strikes  Deter:  A  Non-Parametric 
Investigation. Journal of Human Resources, XLII, 309-330. 
   19 
Imrohoroglu, A., Merlo A. M., and Rupert, P. (2004). What Accounts for the Decline in Crime?. 
International Economic Review, August 2004, 45, 707-729. 
 
Katz.  L,  Levitt  S.D., and  Shustorovich,  E.  (1996).  Prison  Conditions, Capital  Punishment,  and 
Deterrence. American Law and Economic Review, 5(2): 318-343. 
 
Kling, J.R. (forthcoming). Incarceration Length, Employment and Earnings, American Economic 
Review. 
 
Kuziemko,  I.  (2007).  Going  Off  Parole:  How  the  Elimination  of  Discretionary  Prison  Release 
Affects the Social Cost of Crime. NBER Working Paper 13380. 
 
Levitt, S.D. (2004). Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s. Four Factors that Explain the 
Decline and Six that Do Not, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(1), pp.163-190. 
   
Levitt, S.D. and Miles, T.J. (2007). Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment. In Polinsky, M.A. and 
Shavell, S. (eds). The Handbook of Law and Economics, vol 1. North-Holland.  
 
Murton, T. (1976). The Dilemma of Prison Reform. New York: Holt, Rineheart, and Winston.  
 
Owens, E.G. (2006). More Time Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence 
Enhancements. Mimeo, University of Maryland. 
 
Pintoff, R. (2006). Juvenile Jails: A Path to Straight and Narrow or Hardened Criminality? Mimeo, 
University of Maryland. 
 
Polinsky, A. M., Shavell, S. (2000). The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 38, pp. 45–76. 
 
Waldfogel, J. (2004). The Effect of Criminal Conviction on Income and the Trust Reposed on 
Workmen. Journal of Human Resources, 29, 62-81.    
   20 
Western, B., Kling, J.R., Weiman. D.F. (2001). The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration. 
































   21 
Appendix: Types of Crime Included as Control Variables and their Definition 
Drug offences. In this category are included all the violations of the law on the use and selling of 
drugs (Decree of the President of the Republic, 9 October 1990, 309 and subsequent modifications 
and amendments).  
 
Crimes against property. In this category are included theft, larceny, robbery, bag-snatching and all 
the offences regulated by Book II, Section XIII, of the Italian Penal Code. 
 
Crimes  against  public  administrations.  In  this  category  are  included  crimes  against  the  public 
interest and administration, regulated by Book II, Section II of the Italian Penal Code. 
 
Crimes against public safety. In this category are included all crimes related to possible danger to 
the  safety  of  people,  things,  public  utilities,  buildings.  All  the  crimes  under  this  category  are 
included in Book II, Section VI, of the Italian Penal Code. 
 
Violation  of  gun  law.  In  this category  are  included  all  the  violations of  the  law  on  using  and 
carrying guns and other arms (Law 110/75 and subsequent modifications and amendments). 
 
Immigration law. In this category are included all the violations of the law on the regulation of 
immigrations  and  the  juridical  status  of  foreign  citizens  (legislation  of  25  July  1998,  286  and 
subsequent amendments and modifications).  
 
Various crimes against persons. In this category are included assault, homicide, and all offences 
regulated by Book II, Section XII, of the Italian Penal Code. 
 
Corruption and crimes against justice administrations. In this category are included crimes against 
the correct functioning of the justice administration and police and, in general, all crimes regulated 
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Tables and Figures 
 
















Notes. 100 index 1995. The number of inmates per 100,000 inhabitants in the 1995 was: 600 for the U.S., 89 for 
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TA BLE I: D escriptive Statistics
Full Sam ple R ecidivists
Num ber of observations 25,716 2,792
Individual characteristics
M ean  Standard deviation M ean  Standard deviation
Recidivism 0.11 0.31
A ge on exit 36.68 10.07 34.30 8.67
Length of sentence 41.91 35.19 37.42 30.95
D istance from  jurisdiction chief-tow n 15.45 20.92 16.09 22.10
O vercrow ding (num ber of prisoners for 100 available 
places in the detention facility) 151.37 40.94 150.64 42.64
A verage num ber of deaths occurred during detention in 
the sam e facility (for each inm ate)  1.26 2.44 1.30 2.54
Frequency Frequency
G ender
M ale 0.95 0.02
Fem ale 0.05 0.98
N ationality
Italian 0.62 0.63
N on-Italian 0.38 0.37
M arital status
M arried 0.29 0.19
U nm arried 0.57 0.67
O ther 0.14 0.14
Education
Illiterate 0.03 0.04
Prim ary 0.30 0.33
Junior H igh 0.53 0.53
H igh School 0.06 0.06
College (degree or equivalent) 0.01 0.01
O ther 0.07 0.03
Em ploym ent
Perm anently em ployed 0.34 0.24
U nem ployed 0.47 0.59
O ther 0.19 0.17
State of judgem ent
Final judgm ent taken 0.70 0.64
M ixed 0.19 0.24
A ppellant 0.06 0.07
O ther 0.05 0.05
K ind of offense
D rug offenses 0.41 0.37
Crim es against property 0.40 0.49
Crim es against public adm ininstration 0.02 0.02
V iolation of gun law 0.01 0.01
Im m igration bill 0.03 0.02
V arious crim es against persons 0.07 0.05
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TA BLE I.(continues): D escriptive Statistics
M overs Recidivists
Num ber of observations 13,160 1,491
Individual characteristics
M ean  Standard deviation M ean  Standard deviation
Recidivism 0.11 0.32
A ge on exit 36.15 9.81 34.16 8.70
Length of sentence 46.28 37.19 40.52 32.58
D istance from  jurisdiction chief-tow n 18.74 24.26 20.33 26.05
O vercrow ding (num ber of prisoners for 100 available places 
in the detention facility) 149.82 42.18 147.70 43.69
A verage num ber of deaths occurred during detention in the 
sam e facility (for each inm ate)  1.01 1.91 0.95 1.85
Frequency Frequency
G ender
M ale 0.95 0.02
Fem ale 0.50 0.98
N ationality
Italian 0.56 0.56
N on-Italian 0.44 0.44
M arital status
M arried 0.29 0.20
U nm arried 0.59 0.69
O ther 0.12 0.11
Education
Illiterate 0.03 0.02
Prim ary 0.30 0.35
Junior H igh 0.51 0.50
H igh School 0.06 0.04
College (degree or equivalent) 0.01 0.01
O ther 0.09 0.08
Em ploym ent
Perm anently em ployed 0.34 0.27
U nem ployed 0.48 0.59
O ther 0.18 0.14
State of judgem ent
Final judgm ent taken 0.69 0.64
M ixed 0.20 0.24
A ppellant 0.03 0.03
O ther 0.08 0.09
K ind of offense
D rug offenses 0.43 0.40
Crim es against property 0.39 0.46
Crim es against public adm ininstration 0.02 0.02
V iolation of gun law 0.01 0.01
Im m igration bill 0.03 0.02
V arious crim es against persons 0.08 0.05
O ther 0.04 0.04  
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TABLE II: Results on the Effects of Prison Overcrowding
Independent variable  1 2 3
Prison overcrowding index -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00005
(-0.85) (-0.79) (-0.59)
Individual characteristics YES YES YES
Type of crime  NO YES YES
Province fixed effects NO NO YES
R-squared 0.018 0.022 0.032
Observations 11,334 11,334 11,334
Notes: Entries refer to a linear probability model; the dependent variable is a binary variable assuming
value 1 if the inmate has been re-arrested after release and 0 otherwise. The prison overcrowding index is
the number of inmates in each prison for 100 officially available places. Individual variables include:
sentence length, time spent in prison, education, age at date of release, marital status and nationality
dummies, judicial status and employment condition before imprisonnent. t-statistics (in parenthesis)





TABLE III: Results on the Effects of Deaths in Prison
Independent variable 1 2 3 4
Number of deaths in the facility (per capita) 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.28
(0.87) (0.75) (0.33) (0.61)
Individual characteristics YES YES YES YES
Type of crime  NO YES YES YES
Province fixed effects NO NO YES YES
Prison fixed effects NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.018 0.021 0.035 0.053
Observations 11,346 11,346 11,346 11,334
Notes: Entries refer to a linear probability model, the dependent variable is a binary variable assuming value 1 if the inmate has been re-arrested
after the release and 0 otherwise. The number of deaths per capita is the number of deaths ocurred since the inmate's entrance in the facility over
the total number of inmates in the same facility. Individual variables include sentence length, time spent in prison, education, age at date of









   26 
TABLE IV: Results on the Effects of Distance between the Facility and Province Chief Town
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4
Distance 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(2.61) (2.64) (2.77) (2.65)
Prison overcrowding index - - - -0.00005
(-0.65)
Number of deaths in the facility (per 
capita) - - - 0.0493
(0.17)
Individual characteristics YES YES YES YES
Type of crime  NO YES YES YES
Province fixed effects NO NO YES YES
R-squared 0.019 0.022 0.037 0.037
Observations 11,022 11,022 11,022 11,022
Notes: Entries refer to a linear probability model; the dependent variable is a binary variable assuming value 1
if the inmate has been re-arrested after the release and 0 otherwise. Distance expressed as road distance (in
km) between the facility the chief-town of the province where the prison is located. Individual variables
include sentence length, time spent in prison, education, age at date of release, marital status, and nationality
dummies, judicial status and employment condition before imprisonnent. t-statistics (in parenthesis) adjusted
for clustering at the prison level.  
 
Table V: Measures of prison conditions interacted with individual sentence
1 2 3
overcrowding rate -0.0001 - -
(-0.73)
overcrowding rate x sentence 0 - -
(0.51)
number of deaths in the facility (per capita) - 0.4626 -
(0.72)
number of deaths in the facility (per capita) x 
sentence - -0.0022 -
(-0.48 )
distance - - 0.003
(2.77)
distance x sentence - - -0.0012
(-0.45)
Province of residence fixed effects YES YES YES
Prison fixed effects NO YES NO
R-squared 0.035 0.053 0.037
Observations 11,346 11,346 11,022
Notes: Entries refer to a linear probability model; the dependent variable is a binary variable assuming
value 1 if the inmate has been re-arrested after the release and 0 otherwise. Individual variables include
sentence length, time spent in prison, education, age at date of release, marital status, and nationality
dummies, judicial status and employment condition before imprisonnent. t-statistics (in parenthesis)
adjusted for clustering at the prison level.  